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  • Nov 19, 2026, 9:55 PM

    So this Nightmare Eclipse / MSNightmare FastUnlock is sort of a neat code-free parlor trick. But at the end of the day, just another semi-yawn-worthy demonstration of CERT/CC VU#789985.

    The gist is:
    The ephemeral WsiAccount Windows account that is created/used during Windows login-screen login prompts is accessible via Windows Narrator. What makes it abusable is that when Narrator is launched, its focus is on the off-screen components of itself. That is, while you can't see the WsiAccount things running, they're indeed there. Using a bit of Narrator-style navigation through these off-screen dialogs, we can:

    1. Launch Windows SystemSettings.exe
    2. Set the preference for the WsiAccount to automatically display in Explorer the contents of newly connected USB mass storage devices.
    3. Run any program in this new Explorer window that has popped up.

    The writeup states:

    this breaks the guarantee that a properly secured bitlocker machine cannot be accessed even if the attacker has physical access

    But I can't really find any record of Microsoft promising such things. If you have a TPM-only BitLocker configuration, Windows automatically decrypts the hard disk so that it can load. I don't think there's anybody who believes that bitlocker is still in play at the point where Windows is prompting you for credentials. So to suggest that this is a BitLocker bypass is a bit misleading.

    What it is is a way to run arbitrary code on a Windows system without needing to log into it, provided that the account has at least one Microsoft Account configured on it. And as a medium-integrity WsiAccount user. BitLocker is completely irrelevant to anything used in the attack.

    Process monitor log of SystemSettings.exe setting AutoPlayHandlers preferences for the WsiAccount.
Then Explorer launches calc.exe off of the newly connected USB drive.
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Replies

  • Nov 20, 2026, 9:58 AM

    @wdormann,

    > But I can't really find any record of Microsoft promising such things.

    Here: css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/r

    >> "In practice, we expect that many laptops will be used in the TPM-only mode and that scenario is the main driver for the disk cipher design."

    And the whole section 2.7, e.g.:

    >> "(For example, the attacker can modify the ciphertext which stores the startup graphic, and read the corresponding plaintext off the screen during the boot process, though this would take a minute or so per attempt.) We also assume that the OS modifies some sectors in a predictable way during the boot sequence, and the attacker can observe the ciphertext changes."

    > automatically decrypts the hard disk

    It decrypts on-the-fly. It doesn't decrypt the entire disk.

    Again, the TPM+NK mode is affected too, although "online accounts" are unlikely to be used in this setup.

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