@dymaxion @dalias @rob
However, even if we do all that, what we're going to have is an actual JIT, and it will have bugs.
I believe that the size of the JIT is sufficiently constrained that full formal verification is possible.
"I have merely proven this code to be correct, not tested it" etc.
In all of those cases, the proof was clearly not complete and ignored various interfaces.
The main case where this is false is when physical interference is a consideration, as this requires modeling correctness beyond software/logical interactions.
This is usually supposed to be handled by the hardware. ECC is an example.
Mainframes and aeronautics have various more examples. Software design is still affected, but it's entirely insufficient on its own to handle all the issues they purport to address.
Assuming any piece of software will not have security bugs has been comprehensively shown to be a mistake for anything dealing with real systems.
Indeed, even when the program has been correctly compiled to native-equivalent execution, there is zero reason why it should have ambient authority or universal capabilities.
The problem domain here was "JIT should not introduce further hazards", but even in the unlikely event that it does, those hazards should still be subject to all the other containment that affects every piece of software on the system.
I also have to work with real engineering teams to get them to do better in practice, and I've never seen a team in a position to do half the things we know we should do.
And now we really do get back to "is it end capitalism [...]?" as you suggested in your other post.
I'm still not convinced it's strictly required, but certainly one cannot expect zero-liability corposcum do to proper engineering in any way that resembles what I suggest.
If they had the kind of liability other engineering fields have for fuckups that cause harm, grievous harm or death to users or third parties?
Now that might change a bit.