Login
You're viewing the y.diskcat.com public feed.
  • Nov 12, 2026, 12:13 PM

    @michael @YoungImpAngel @campuscodi @splinux

    There is no reason to think that an effort capable of verifying 38,000 vulnerabilities wouldn’t have been able to identify 2.

    It makes no sense to generate massive numbers of error reports that consist, for the most part, of false positives. That’s like thinking it’s reasonable to check the time on a broken analog clock—after all, it’s right twice a day, isn’t it?

    💬 1🔄 0⭐ 4

Replies

  • Nov 12, 2026, 12:17 PM
    It didn't identify 2. It identified 442. The 2 is a meaningless number.

    Whether the effort to go from 38000 to 442 is worth it depends on how much is done automatically and how much has to be done manually by the projects. Slop machines tend to produce a PoC for findings these days, and if the 38000 were whittled down to, say, 4000 with PoC, before reporting, it's very likely worth it.
    💬 0🔄 0⭐ 0
  • Nov 12, 2026, 12:29 PM

    @michael @YoungImpAngel @campuscodi @splinux
    As you rightly point out, there are 37,558 false positives or duplicates.

    Regarding the remainder, we know they were accepted as CVEs, but we do not know:

    * the risk rating for each of those 442 entries;
    * which ones affected active library versions;
    * the conditions required to exploit the vulnerability.

    1/2

    💬 0🔄 0⭐ 1
  • Nov 12, 2026, 12:29 PM

    @michael @YoungImpAngel @campuscodi @splinux

    As you also rightly note, it is remarkable to assume that—given these tools can identify so many potential exploits—the very people who create such exploits wouldn't be using these same tools themselves.

    In the wild: 2

    2/2

    💬 0🔄 0⭐ 1