i don't agree with the framing that OIDC stands against big SSO providers, especially since the majority who've served on the board of the OpenID Foundation were representatives of big SSO providers. i think it serves a similar purpose to the big cloud providers standardising on Kubernetes:
- shed the cost of each maintaining their own complete implementation
- plausible deniability of corporate control through an "independent" foundation
- plausible deniability of lock-in, even though they know in 99% of cases one of them will be chosen as the identity/cloud provider, and it's hard to switch away once users have chosen a provider
- easier customer acquisition, since engineers are more likely to have spent their free time learning the standard if it's open, and the plausible deniablity makes them feel more comfortable using/recommending it
- unpaid volunteers will provide tooling and language/framework bindings, and will do it with better coverage than the providers could manage themselves
to expand on what I mean by centralisation, say you offer a service with a variety of identity providers, but the majority of your users all choose the same one. that provider then comes to you and says "hello, we found that your service doesn't comply with point 293 of our community guidelines. you have 30 days to remove the offending content, or we will block you. good day.", what do you do? you can either censor yourself or your users, or you can scramble to implement a migration flow, ask users to migrate ASAP, and then still lose a large chunk of your users because they did not do it ASAP. consider also the data harvesting potential for an identity provider that gets to see where all their users log on, and what information they share.
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