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  • Oct 20, 2026, 6:22 PM

    also, this entire ordeal could have been prevented by SIMPLY NOT TESTING IN PROD, and this testing in prod was APPROVED BY EVERYONE INVOLVED

    there appears to be a flaw in the KGC script that was used on that specific day to create these ECC issuers. As for these ECC keys, our review of the KGC, assessment of the code and view of HSM keys so far indicate that a) a set of original ECC keys were created onboard as expected b) an approved deviation to our usual KGC to test a wrap/unwrap was introduced as these keys were meant for export for this instance c) a flaw in the code resulted in the second pair of keys being created onboard which were weaker d) these second pair of weaker keys were used by mistake to create the csr (because the key labels were similar) and signed by our root e) the CSR from these weaker keys were also sent over to Sectigo for cross signing (we verified the files sent over to Sectigo)

    (emphasis mine; source)

    eMudhra should, under no circumstances, ever be trusted again

    💬 1🔄 8⭐ 18

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